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Abstract
I propose an understanding of Everett and Wheeler’s relative-state
interpretation of quantum mechanics, which restores the feature of in-
determinism to the theory. This incorporates a theory of probability
as truth values in a many-valued logic for future statements, and a
contextual theory of truth which gives objective and subjective per-
spectives equal validity.
1 Introduction
When quantum mechanics emerged in the 1920s as the basic format in which
all subsequent theories of physics would be couched, it exhibited two distinct
features which represented its radical conceptual departure from classical
physics. These two features have been given [21] the confusingly similar
labels of indeterminacy and indeterminism.
Indeterminacy is the more startling and harder to grasp of these two
new concepts, yet it has the clearer mathematical formulation in the theory.
Physically, it is the idea that physical quantities need not have definite values.
Mathematically, this is expressed by the representation of such quantities by
hermitian operators instead of real numbers, and the mathemtical fact that
not every vector is an eigenvector of such an operator. This yields the physical
notion of superposition, well known as a stumbling block in understanding
the theory.
Indeterminism, on the other hand, is simply the opposite of determinism,
as canonically expressed by Laplace [12]. It is the denial of the idea that the
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future of the universe is rigidly determined by its present state. It can be
seen as not so much a rejection, more a reluctant abandonment: if Laplace’s
determinism is seen, not as a statement of faith, but as a declaration of intent
— “We will look for an exact cause in the past of everything that happens in
the physical world” — then quantum theory is an admission of failure: “We
will not try to find the reason why a radioactive nucleus decays at one time
rather than another; we do not believe that there is any physical reason for
its decay at a particular time.”
Indeterminism, unlike indeterminacy, does not present any conceptual
difficulty. In the history of human thought, the determinism of classical
physics is a fairly recent and, to many, a rather troubling idea. To the
pre-scientific mind, whether in historical times or in our own childhood, the
apparent fact of experience is surely that there are things which might happen
but they might not: you can never be sure of the future. As it is put in the
Bible, “time and chance happeneth to them all”.
On simply being told that the new theory of physics is to be indetermin-
istic, one might think one could see the general form that theory would take:
given a mathematical description of the state of a physical system at time t0,
there would be a mathematical procedure which, instead of yielding a single
state at each subsequent time t > t0, would yield a set of possible states and
a probability distribution over this set. This would give a precise expression
of the intuition that some things are more likely to happen than others; the
probabilities would be objective facts about the world.
But this is not how indeterminism is manifested in quantum mechanics.
As it was conceived by Bohr and formalised by Dirac [6] and von Neumann
[22] and most textbooks ever since (the “Copenhagen interpretation”), the
indeterminism does not enter into the way the world develops by itself, but
only in the action of human beings doing experiments. In the basic laws
governing physical evolution, probabilities occur only in the projection pos-
tulate, which refers to the results of experiments. The idea that experiments
should play a basic part in the theory has been trenchantly criticised by John
Bell [4]. This unsatisfactory, poorly defined and, frankly, ugly aspect of the
theory consititutes the measurement problem of quantum mechanics.
It could be argued that the indeterminism of quantum theory is played
down in the Copenhagen interpretation, in the sense that the role of time in
physical probability is minimised. This is not a formal feature of the theory,
but an aspect of its presentation. Experiments are presented as if they took
no time to be completed; probabilities are properties of the instantaneous
state. Heisenberg referred to the contents of the state vector as representing
potentiality, and this aspect of the state vector has been emphasised by de
Ronde [5], but it seems to me that the idea of something being potential
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looks to the future for its actualisation.
The theory remained in this state (and some say it still does) until the
papers of Everett and Wheeler in 1957. Everett, as endorsed by Wheeler,
argued that there was no need for the projection postulate and no need for
experiments to play a special role in the theory. But this did not give a
satisfactory place for indeterminism in the theory: on the contrary, quantum
mechanics according to Everett is essentially deterministic and probability is
generally regarded as a problem for the Everett-Wheeler interpretation.
There are at least four different concepts that go under the name of
“probability” (or, if you think that it is a single concept, four theories of
probability) [10]. Probability can be a strength of logical entailment, a fre-
quency, a degree of belief, or a propensity. Physicists tend to favour what
they see as a no-nonsense definition of probability in terms of frequencies, but
in the context of physics this is ultimately incoherent. Classical deterministic
physics has a place for probability in situations of incomplete knowledge; this
is how Laplace considers probability. The concept being used here is degree
of belief. Some quantum physicists [8] would like to retain this concept in
the indeterministic realm. Many, however, would reject this subjectivist ap-
proach as abandoning the ideal of an objective theory. The most appropriate
concept for an indeterministic theory, as outlined above, would seem to be
that of propensity; if there is a set of possible future states for a system,
the system has various propensities to fall into these states. This gives an
objective meaning of “probability”. This concept is also appropriate to the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics: an experimental setup
has propensities to give the different possible results of the experiment. The
Everett-Wheeler picture, however, seems to have no place for propensities.
Everett liked to describe the universal state vector, which occupies centre
stage in his theory, as giving a picture of many worlds ; Wheeler, I think
rightly, rejected this language. Both views, however, attribute simultaneous
existence to the different components of the universal state vector which are
the seat of probabilities in the Copenhagen interpretation. It is hard to see
how propensities can attach to them. Everett, consequently, pursued the
idea of probabilities as frequencies, and even claimed to derive the quantum-
mechanical formula for probability (the Born rule) rather than simply pos-
tulating it. It is generally agreed, however, that his argument was circular
([23], p. 127).
In this article I will explore the Everett-Wheeler formulation of quantum
mechanics from the point of view of a sentient physical system inside the
world, such as each of us. I argue that it is necessary to recognise the
validity of two contexts for physical propositions: an external context, in
which the universal state vector provides the truth about the world and its
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development is deterministic; and an internal context in which the world is
seen from a component of the universal state vector. In the latter context
the development in time is indeterministic; probabilities apply, in a particular
component at a particular time, to statements referring to the future. This
leads to a fifth concept of probability: the probability of a statement in
the future tense is the degree of truth of that statement. I conclude with
a formulation of the predictions of quantum mechanics from the internal
perspective which fits the template for an indeterministic theory described
earlier in this section: for each state at time t0, the universal state vector
provides a set of possible states at subsequent times t > t0 and a probabiilty
distribution over this set.
I start by arguing for the relative-state interpretation of Everett and
Wheeler as the best approach to the problem of understanding quantum
theory.
2 The relative-state understanding of quan-
tum mechanics
How can we approach the problem of understanding quantum mechanics?
First, some principles: what understanding a scientific theory means to
me. I want to take our best science seriously; whatever a successful theory
supposes, I am disposed to believe that that is the truth about the world.
But secondly, I want to take my own experience seriously. Too often, ex-
positors of science tell us that what we experience is an illusion. Of course,
illusions do exist: when I see a stick bending as it is put into water at less
than a right angle to the surface of the water, that is an illusion, and it can
be demonstrated to be an illusion by immediate appeal to other experiences.1
But there are other experiences that are too basic to be illusory. Such fun-
damental aspects of our experience as time, and consciousness, and free will,
and the solidity of solids [18], cannot be illusions. It may be that we have a
false theory of these phenomena – for example, that free will consists of an
interruption to the laws of nature, or that the solid state consists of a math-
ematical continuum – it may, indeed, be difficult to define them precisely –
but that does not mean that the phenomena themselves are not real.
1Such illusions are less common than is often thought. We are told that Copernicus
discovered that it was an illusion that the sun goes round the earth. Not so: it is true
that the sun goes round the earth. Einstein taught us that any such statement is relative
to a frame of reference, and in my rest frame the sun does indeed go round me once a
day. This reflection is relevant to the understanding of quantum mechanics suggested here,
with “frame of reference” replaced by “perspective”.
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Now here’s the problem. It seems to be impossible to apply both of
these principles in understanding quantum mechanics. One of the basic facts
of our experience which I cannot disbelieve is that (properly conducted)
experiments have well-defined, unique results. But there are no such unique
results of experiment in pure quantum theory.
What do I mean by “pure quantum theory”? The mathematical ma-
chinery is not in question: Hilbert spaces to describe the possible states of
systems, tensor products to combine them, Hamiltonians to describe inter-
actions, the Schro¨dinger equation to govern evolution. That is clear-cut.
But if the theory is to include our unique experience, it seems that further,
more vague, elements have to be added to this clear theory. What is tradi-
tionally taught as quantum mechanics therefore includes, in addition to the
Schro¨dinger equation, the “collapse postulate”: a stochastic evolution which
delivers a state vector incorporating the uniqueness that we experience. For
some reason, this only happens after a “measurement”, though nobody has
ever made precise what exactly a measurement is; so it does not describe our
experience when we are not making measurements [19]. I therefore follow
Everett and Wheeler in not including this part of the text-book account in
what I mean by “quantum theory”.
The preceding criticisms do not apply to theories of spontaneous collapse
like the GRW theory [9], which was designed to overcome these objections,
but such theories go beyond orthodox quantum theory and, in principle,
are empirically distinguishable from it. This response to the challenge of
understanding quantum theory essentially consists of saying “It’s hopeless
— quantum mechanics can’t be understood; we need to replace it with a
different theory”. That may be correct, but in this article I want to persevere
in the attempt to understand the pure theory of quantum mechanics.
It then seems that my two basic principles are incompatible. If the science
of quantum theory is true, then experiments have no unique results and our
experience of such uniquenesss cannot be trusted. We cannot take quantum
mechanics seriously and at the same time take our basic experience seriously.
This dilemma has the same form as some perennial philosophical prob-
lems. For example,
1. The existence of space-time vs the passage of time;
2. Determinism vs free will (or, indeed, indeterminism vs free will);
3. The physical description of brain states vs conscious experience;
4. Duty vs self-interest
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This general class of philosophical problems has been discussed by Thomas
Nagel in his book The View from Nowhere [15]. Each of the above examples
is, or seems to be, a contradiction between two statements or principles, both
of which we seem to have good reason to believe. In each case one of the
statements is a general universal statement — what Nagel calls “a view from
nowhere” — to which assent seems to be compelled by scientific investigation
or moral reflection; the other is a matter of immediate experience, seen from
inside the universe (a view from “now here”).
Nagel suggests that we can resolve these contradictions by recognising
that the apparently opposed statements can both be true, but in differ-
ent contexts (or from different perspectives). Statements in the view from
nowhere do not contradict statements in the view from now here, they just
do not engage with them; the two types of statement are incommensurable.
But, provided we are careful to specify the context of each statement, we will
see that in each pair, the apparently opposed statements are compatible.
In order to see how these ideas apply to quantum mechanics, let us look
at the famous example of Schro¨dinger’s cat.
Schro¨dinger’s sad story [17] is often presented as a challenge to quantum
mechanics. When the unfortunate cat has been in Schro¨dinger’s diabolical
device for a time t, the crude argument (not Schro¨dinger’s!) goes, its state is
|ψcat(t)〉 = e−γt|alive〉+
√
1− e−2γt|dead〉
So why don’t we see such superpositions of live and dead cats?
The answer is simple. If we are watching the cat, hoping to see a super-
position like the above, the interaction by which we see it actually produces
the entangled state
|Ψ(t)〉 = e−γt|alive〉cat|  ⌣〉observer +
√
1− e−2γt|dead〉cat|  ⌢〉observer
in which |  ⌣〉 is the observer state of seeing a live cat and |  ⌢〉 is the state
of seeing a dead cat. Nowhere in this total state is there an observer seeing
a superposition of a live and a dead cat.
But that doesn’t tell us what there actually is in the state |Ψ(t)〉. In
order to understand the meaning of this superposition, let us look at it more
carefully.
If the observer is watching the cat continuously over the period from time
0 to time t, they will be able to note the time, if any, at which they see the
cat die. Then the joint state of the cat and the observer is something like
|Ψ(t)〉 = e−γt|alive〉cat|“The cat is alive”〉observer
+
√
2γ
∫ t′
0
e−γt
′ |dead〉cat|“I saw the cat die at time t′”〉observerdt′ (2.1)
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in which the observer states contain propositions which are physically en-
coded in the brain of the observer. But what is their status as propositions;
are they true or false? Each is believed by a brain which has observed the
fact it describes, and that fact belongs to reality. As a human belief, each
statement could not be more true. Yet they cannot all be true, for they
contradict each other.
This conflict shows the necessity of considering the perspective from which
a statement is made when discussing its truth value. When this is done, it
becomes possible for contradictory statements to be simultaneously true,
each in its own context.
In general, the state of the universe can be expanded in terms of the
states of any observer inside the universe as
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
n
|ηn〉|Φn(t)〉
where the |ηn〉 form an orthonormal basis of observer states, which we can
take to be eigenstates of definite experience; the |Φn(t)〉 are the corresponding
states of the rest of the universe at time t. The latter are not normalised;
indeed, most of them will be zero. It is only possible for the observer to
experience being in one of the states |ηn〉, and in this state it is true for the
observer that the only experience they have is ηn; the observer is justified,
at time t, in deducing that the rest of the universe is in the unique state
|Φn(t)〉. This is the internal truth relative to the experience state |ηn〉.
But there is also the external truth that the state of the whole universe is
|Ψ(t)〉. From this standpoint all the experiences ηn truly occur. In Everett’s
terms, |Φn(t)〉 is the relative state of the rest of the universe relative to the
observer’s state |ηn〉.
Thus there are the following two types of truth involved.
External truth: The truth about the universe is given by a state vector
|Ψ(t)〉 in a Hilbert space HU , evolving according to the Schro¨dinger equation.
If the Hilbert space can be factorised as
HU = HS ⊗HE
where HS contains states of an experiencing observer, then
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
n
|ηn〉|Φn(t)〉
and all the states |ηn〉 for which |Φn(t)〉 6= 0 describe experiences which
actually occur at time t.
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Internal truth from the perspective |ηn〉: I actually have experience ηn,
which tells me that the rest of the universe is in the state |Φn(t)〉. This is an
objective fact; everybody I have talked to agrees with me.
This distinction between internal and external truth is an example of
Nagel’s distinction between the view from nowhere and the view from “now
here”. Scientists might be tempted to exalt the external statement as the ob-
jective truth, downgrading internal statements as merely subjective. Indeed,
Nagel himself uses the terminology of “objective” and “subjective” [14]. But
he does not use a dismissive qualifier like “merely” to denigrate the subjec-
tive: he is at pains to emphasise that the truth of an internal statement has
a vividness and immediacy, resulting from the fact that it is actually expe-
rienced, compared to which external truth is “bleached-out”. This applies
most obviously in contexts like ethics and aesthetics, but we would do well
to remember it in our scientific context; as I have pointed out above, it is the
internal statement which has the scientific justification of being supported
by evidence, and is objective in the usual sense that it is empirical and is
agreed by all observers who can communicate with each other.
But the situation is more complicated than this might suggest. It is
not that there is a God-like being who can survey the whole universe and
make statements about the universal state vector, distinct from us physical
beings who are trapped in one component of |Ψ〉. We physical beings are
the ones who make statements about |Ψ〉, for good theoretical reasons, from
our situation in which we experience just the one component |ηn〉|Φn〉. From
that perspective, what are we to make of the other components |ηm〉|Φm〉?
Consider a measurement process, in which an initial state |Ψ(0)〉 =
|η0〉|Φ0(0)〉, containing only one experience η0, develops in time t to an en-
tangled state |Ψ(t)〉 =∑ |ηn〉|Φn(t)〉. The external statement is:
|Ψ(t)〉 represents a true statement about the universe, and all
its components are real.
The observer who experiences only |ηn〉 must say:
I know that only |ηn〉 is real (because I experience only that),
and therefore |Φn(t)〉 represents a true statement about the rest
of the universe. But I also know that |Ψ(t)〉 is true (because I’ve
calculated it). The other |ηm〉|Φm〉 represent things that might
have happened but didn’t.
These statements are font-coded, using bold type for internal (vivid, expe-
rienced) judgements, and italic for external (pale, theoretical) ones, even
though these are made by an internal observer.
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It is a constant temptation in physics, on finding a quantum system in a
superposition |φ〉+|ψ〉, to think that it is either in the state |φ〉 or in the state
|ψ〉. This, after all, is the upshot when we look at the result of an experiment.
Despite the stern warnings of our lecturers when we are learning the subject,
and the proof from the two-slit experiment that “+” cannot mean “or” ([21],
pp. 188-9), we all probably slip into this way of thinking at times; and the
common-sense view of Schro¨dinger’s cat seems to justify it. On the other
hand, the many-worlds view insists that both terms in the superposition are
real, and therefore “+” means “and”. What I am suggesting here is that
both “and” and “or” are valid interpretations of “+” in different contexts:
“and” in the external view, “or” in the internal view.
How Many Worlds? The foregoing needs some refinement. Quantum su-
perposition is not just a single binary operation “+” on states, but is modified
by coefficients: a|φ〉 + b|ψ〉 is a weighted superposition of the (normalised)
states |φ〉 and |ψ〉. In interpreting “+” as “or”, it is easy to incorporate this
weighting of the disjuncts by interpreting it in terms of probability. But if
we interpret “+” as “and”, as in the many-worlds interpretation, what can
it mean to weight the conjuncts? Let us look back to the paradigmatic ge-
ometrical meaning of vector addition. “Going north-east” is the vector sum
of “going north” and “going east”, and does indeed mean going north and
going east at the same time. But “going NNE” also means going north and
going east at the same time; only there is more going north than going east.
So if a superposition a|φ〉 + b|ψ〉 of macroscopic states |φ〉 and |ψ〉 means
that both |φ〉 and ψ〉 are real in different worlds, we must accept that they
are not “equally real”, as is often carelessly stated by Everettians (including
Everett himself [7] — in a footnote — but not Wheeler [24]), but that they
are real to different extents |a|2 and |b|2. Adding up these degrees of reality,
we then find that there are not many worlds but (|a|2 + |b|2 =) one.
Another argument for this conclusion uses the physical observable of
particle number. The many-worlds view regards the state vector |Ψ(t)〉 =∑
n |ηn〉|Φn(t)〉 as describing many (say N) worlds, with N different copies
of the observer having the different experiences |ηn〉. Suppose the observer’s
name is Alice. There is an observable called Alice number, of which each of
the states |ηn〉|Φn(t)〉 is an eigenstate with eigenvalue 1. Then |Ψ(t)〉 is also
an eigenstate of Alice number with eigenvalue 1 (not N). There is only one
Alice.
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3 Probability and the Future
3.1 Probability
The observer in this measurement process might go on to say:
I saw a transition from |η1〉 to |ηn〉 at some time t′ < t. But
I know that |Ψ(t′)〉 didn’t collapse. The other |ηm〉|Φm〉 might
come back and interfere with me in the future; but this has very
low probability.
This shows how the conflicting statements about time development in the
Everett-Wheeler and Copenhagen interpretations can after all be compatible.
The continuous Schro¨dinger-equation evolution postulated by the Everett-
Wheeler interpretation refers to the external view; the collapses postulated
by the Copenhagen interpretation refer to the internal view, i.e. to what we
actually see. The occurrence of collapse, in the form of perceived quantum
jumps in the memory of an observer, becomes a theorem rather than a pos-
tulate (see [19] for some indications, but work remains to be done on this).
We also see that it is only the internal statement that mentions probability.
But what does it mean?
The meaning of probability is a long-standing philosophical problem (see,
for example, [10]). There are in fact several distinct concepts which go by
the name of probability, sharing only the fact that they obey the same math-
ematical axioms. The clearest of these, perhaps, is degree of belief, which
has the advantage that it can be defined operationally: someone’s degree of
belief in a proposition is equal to the odds that they are prepared to offer
in a bet that the proposition is true. The subjective nature of this concept
seems to chime with the fact that it belongs in internal statements, as we
have just seen, and indeed similar views of probability are often adopted by
Everettians even though their general stance is objectivist.
However, we have also seen that “internal” should not be equated with
“subjective”, and our experience in a quantum-mechanical world seems to
require a description in terms of objective chance. Things happen randomly,
but with definite probabilities that cannot be reduced to our beliefs. The
value of the half-life of uranium 238 is a fact about the world, not a mere
consequence of someone’s belief.
Such objective probability (or “chances”) can only refer to future events.
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3.2 The Future
What kinds of statements can be made at time t0 about some future time t >
t0, if the universal state vector is known to be |Ψ(t0)〉 and its decomposition
with respect to experience states of a particular observer is
∑
n |ηn〉|Φn(t0)〉?
From the external perspective, the future state |Ψ(t)〉 is determined by the
Schro¨dinger equation and there is no question of any probability. From the
internal perspective relative to an experience state |ηn〉, there is a range of
possible future states |ηm〉, and probabilities must enter into the statement of
what the future state will be. But here is a fundamental problem: there is no
such thing as what the future state will be. As Bell pointed out [3], quantum
mechanics gives no connection between a component of |Ψ〉 at one time and
any component at another time; so what is it that we can assign probabilities
to? How can “the probability that my state will be |ηm〉 tomorrow” mean
anything when “my state will be |ηm〉 tomorrow” has no meaning?
This puzzle takes us back to ways of thinking that are much older than
quantum mechanics, indeed older than all of modern science. The success of
Newtonian deterministic physics has led us to assume that there always is a
definite future, and even when we drop determinism we tend to continue in
the same assumption. There is a future, even if we do not and cannot know
what it will be. But this was not what Aristotle believed, and maybe it is
not what we believed when we were children.
Aristotle, in a famous passage [1], considered the proposition “There will
be a sea-battle tomorrow”. He argued that this proposition is neither true
nor false (otherwise we are forced into fatalism). Thus he rejected the law
of excluded middle for future-tense statements, implying that they obey a
many-valued logic. Modern logicians [16] have considered the possibility of
a third truth-value in addition to “true” or “false”, namely u for “undeter-
mined”, for future-tense statements. But, interestingly, Aristotle admitted
that the sea-battle might be more or less likely to take place. This suggests
that the additional truth values needed for future-tense statements are not
limited to one, u, but can be any real number between 0 and 1 and should be
identified with the probability that the statement will come true.2 Turning
this round gives us an objective form of probability which applies to future
events, or to propositions in the future tense; in a slogan,
Probability = degree of future truth.
A form of temporal logic incorporating this idea is developed in [20].
It contains a lattice of propositions in the context of a particular observer
2This idea motivated  Lukasiewicz [13] in formulating modern many-valued logic, and
has been applied to quantum mechanics by Pykacz [2].
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and a particular time t0 (“now”). The lattice is generated by propositions
corresponding to the observer’s experience eigenstates, labelled by time t.
The observer is assumed to have a memory of experiences occurring before
t0: thus propositions in the present tense (t = t0) and in the past tense
(t < t0) have truth values 0 or 1, as in classical logic, but those in the
future tense (t > t0) can take any truth value in the real interval [0, 1].
General propositions are formed from these dated experience propositions
by means of conjunction, disjunction and negation (“and”, “or” and “not”).
A conjunction of experience propositions is a history in the sense of the
consistent-histories formulation of quantum mechanics; then a conjunction
of histories is another history, but the general proposition is a disjunction of
histories – something which is not usually considered in this formulation. It is
shown in [20] that, given a weak form of the assumption that the histories are
consistent, the usual formula for the probability of a history can be extended
to truth values for all propositions, with logical properties that are to be
expected from identifying truth values with probabilities.
The Open Future We find it hard, in a scientific theory, to accommo-
date the idea that there is no definite future. To be sure, we have inde-
terministic theories in which the future is not uniquely determined by the
past, but such stochastic theories deal with complete histories encompassing
past, present and future; probabilities refer to which of these histories is ac-
tual. Indeterminism, in the usual stochastic formulation, consists of the fact
that there are many such histories containing a given past up to a certain
time, so the future extension is not unique; but the underlying assumption
is that only one of these future histories is real, so that the future is fixed
even though it is not determined. In contrast, the formulation of quantum
mechanics outlined here — or what Bell [3] called the “Everett (?) theory”
— is, I think, the only form of scientific theory in which the future is gen-
uinely open. Unlike Bell, I do not regard this as a problem for the theory;
it tells a truth which we should be happy to acknowledge. The function of
the theory is to provide a catalogue of possibilities and specify how these
change (deterministically) with time; it does not and cannot say which of
the possibilities is actualised at any time. The “measurement problem” of
quantum theory is no more than the difficulty of accepting this format for a
scientific theory; with a change of gestalt, we can see it as a natural way to
formulate indeterminism.
However, I must emphasise the roles that entanglement and the concept of
internal truth play in this resolution of the measurement problem. Without
these, there would be a “preferred basis” problem: if the universal wave func-
tion is a catalogue of possibilities, what basis defines the components which
are to be regarded as possibilities? But there is no preferred-basis problem
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in the relative-state interpretation, as understood here. The possibilities are
given by experience states, which only exist if the universal Hilbert state has
a tensor product structure in which one of the factors describes a system ca-
pable of experience, i.e. which has a basis of states exhibiting the structure
of propositions describing experience. It is not required that this structure
should be unique; in principle, it is possible that the universal Hilbert space
has more than one tensor product structure with the required properties. If
this should be so, statements about these different experiences would also
be (internally) true, relative to these different structures; this would not de-
tract from the truth of the original experience propositions. Both kinds of
internal proposition would be compatible with the external truth of the same
universal state vector.
This potential ambiguity is not peculiar to quantum mechanics: a the-
ory of conscious observers in classical physics would also admit the logical
possibility that a single physical structure could admit two different inter-
pretations in terms of conscious beings. It is hard to imagine that this could
actually occur with systems complex enough to record experiences; neverthe-
less, it has been shown that in simpler systems such ambiguous factorisation
can arise in quantum mechanics, and that decoherence can be exhibited in
both factorisations [11]. This does not show that an understanding based on
such factorisation, like that outlined here, is untenable.
4 Summary
Here is how I understand nonrelativistic quantum mechanics.
1. From the external perspective there is, at each time t, a true descrip-
tion of the physical world given by a state vector |Ψ(t)〉 in a Hilbert space
HU .
2. The sequence of states |Ψ(t)〉 satisfies the Schro¨dinger equation with
a universal Hamiltonian HU .
3. In general, a description of the physical world from the external per-
spective is given by a closed subspace of the Hilbert space HU . Such a
description has, at time t, the degree of truth 〈Ψ(t)|Π|Ψ(t)〉 where Π is the
orthogonal projection onto the relevant closed subspace.
4. Suppose the universe has a subsystem S which has sufficient structure
to experience and record propositions about the physical world. Then HU =
HS ⊗H′ where HS is the state space of the experiencing subsystem S. Let
{|ηn〉} be an orthonormal basis of HS which includes all possible experiences
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of S. Then the true state of the universe (from the external perspective) can
be expanded as
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
n
|ηn〉|Φn(t)〉
with |Φn(t)〉 ∈ H′. From the external perspective, an experience |ηn〉 is real
at time t if |Φn(t)〉 6= 0, and the component |ηn〉|Φn(t)〉 describes a world
which has a degree of reality 〈Φ(t)|Φ(t)〉 at time t.
5. From the internal perspective of the experiencing system S in the state
|ηN〉 at time t0, there is, for each time t ≤ t0, one true experience (recorded
in memory) described by a basis vector |ηn(t)〉 with n(t0) = N .
6. From the perspective of the experiencing system S in state |ηN〉 at
time t0, the statement that its experience state at a future time t > t0 will
be |ηm〉 has truth value
∣∣〈Ψ(t)| (Πm ⊗ I) e−iH(t−t0)/~ (ΠN ⊗ I) |Ψ(t0)∣∣2
〈Ψ(t)| (Πm ⊗ I) |Ψ(t)〉〈Ψ(t0)| (ΠN ⊗ I) |Ψ(t0)〉 .
where Πm is the orthogonal projector onto |ηm〉 in HS. The experiencing
subject S refers to this as the probability that they will experience ηm at
time t.
7. From the perspective of the experiencing system S in state |ηN〉 at
time t0, the significance of the universal state vector |Ψ(t)〉 is as follows.
For t ≤ t0, |Ψ(t)〉 describes what might have happened but didn’t, as well
as what actually did happen.
For t > t0, |Ψ(t)〉 describes what might be going to happen at time t.
Thus, from the internal perspective, the universal state vector |Ψ(t)〉 is
not a description of reality but an influence governing changes in reality.
Things that didn’t actually happen still, in principle, have an effect on what
is going to happen.
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